By the time I left Syria, on 5th April, the anti-government protests had been prevalent mainly in the southern regions and coastal towns. Warnings spread on the British tourist websites advising people to stay inside and keep away from windows. Since then, the unrest has spread throughout the country and into the capital Damascus, with as many as 800 people having been killed.
Although this is the largest demonstration in Syria’s history, it is not their first. One only has to look to 1982, where Hafiz al-Assad (the current President’s father), ordered the ‘Hama Massacre’, whereby the army murdered as many as 20,000 citizens in an attempt to quell a revolt in the city of Hama. This spread fear and deterred many Syrians from challenging the punitive power of the regime.
The tanks on the streets of the southern town of Deraa a few weeks ago undoubtedly brought back vivid memories of 1982. But can this be deemed a ‘father like son’ moment? Despite what happened in Deraa the other day, “it is hard to know exactly what is going on with the government,” said *Daniel, a British student studying Arabic in Damascus. Bashar al-Assad’s background suggests he is one of the more enlightened leaders in the Arab world. Initially he had very few political aspirations; moreover, he only became President when his older brother died in a motor accident. He studied ophthalmology in both Damascus and London, and even has a British wife. Daniel goes onto say that “it is precisely this background that has led people to give him the benefit of the doubt.”
It is important to remember that Bashar “still has many of his father’s influences in government, and it is these people that are giving the orders to send in the tanks.” An advisor associated with this form of corruption is Rami Makhlouf. Not only does he control billions of dollars in Syria’s economy, he is a first cousin of Bashar; “I heard at one demonstration chants of ‘down with Makhlouf!’” It seems that Bashar is not the one “calling the shots, Bashar can only say ‘no’ so many times, before his advisors decide to get rid of him”.
From visiting the country it is clear to see that Bashar is very popular and widely loved by his people. His poster is in every shop; his face on every corner, car and flag. The Shabab, literally meaning ‘the youth’, drive through the streets, waving flags, chanting his name and beeping their horns, regardless of the time of day or night! Daniel told me how, to some western reporters, authenticity was not their main priority; he saw a reporter tell a crowd of people to start chanting and shouting when he began recording on his phone.
Thus it is generally thought that Bashar al-Assad can play a role in the quest for popular democratic empowerment, “even though his openness to change may be a deliberate front of his Presidency.” Due to his vast popularity one does get the impression that if “Bashar made some big changes he could still last as President.” The Syrians must be careful; “the increase in democratic rights has to happen slowly, it is no good just getting rid of the regime, if that is what they want; it would create a power vacuum.”
However Daniel sees the army as an important key to the solution, and “until the army defects, there is little chance of regime change.” This is because the core of the army are loyal to the Assads, and therefore have tied interests with them. The 800 murdered citizens exemplify the fact that there are too many vested interests for there to be a peaceful solution.
Importantly, the vast majority of the Syrian people are not demonstrating against the tyrannical rule of Bashar, as such. Rather they are protesting about the lack of freedom. Specifically the protests are most commonly against the Mukhabarat, the secret police.
Just before I got into a taxi, I was told to be wary of what I said (for instance, it would be “foolish” to mention Israel), as often the secret police work undercover as taxi drivers. The secret police are hated amongst the population, these are the ones who imprisoned, beaten or killed their friends and relatives.
However, “until now no one would have spoken out against them, simply because no one knows who’s in the secret police, thus risk being taken political prisoner, or worse.” Whilst I was there I heard stories of tourists who were innocuously walking through crowds of protesters being taken political prisoners, due to their ‘involvement in the bringing down of the regime.’
But it would seem that even the inauspicious presence of the Mukhabarat has not put off the demonstrators; one of the main “driving forces behind the protests is the internet.” Rumours and arrangements for protests are mainly organised online in blogs. Crucially, the use of the internet “has enabled the youth to take a central role in the demonstrations, as they are the ones who use the internet the most, so they could pass on instructions to large groups.”
Towards the end of my visit, anti-government protests were taking place more frequently, mainly in the evenings. It was most common for the “demonstrations to happen after evening prayers, especially after Friday prayers. This was one of the times in the day where everyone is together.” A crowd fresh from prayers from the largest Mosque in Damascus, the Umayyad Mosque, would prove very difficult to disperse quickly.
So what exactly is going on inside the Mosque during Friday prayers? Are instructions being given out? Is the Imam exciting everyone? I do not think we will ever really know. However, “the Mosque in Damascus is Sunni, whereas the Assads are Alawites, a prominent religious group that constitutes a branch of Shia Islam.” The city of Deraa, which has experienced the severe crackdown, is also a Sunni community, as was Hama in 1982. Although this may go some way to explain the goings on; it is for the individual to judge the significance of the religious implications in the demonstrations against the regime.
* name changed for confidentiality